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Slightly Guilty
Frederick Schauert

In 1974, John Connally, former Governor of Texas and former
Secretary of the Treasury under President Richard Nixon, was
charged in a United States district court with having accepted
money from milk companies in exchange for exercising his political
influence on their behalf. After a lengthy trial, Connally was acquitted by a jury. When he was a candidate for the United States
Senate a year later, however, opponents raised Connally's alleged
criminal activities as an issue in the campaign. An indignant Connally objected that raising the issue was unfair, for Connally characterized his acquittal as a total vindication. Connally claimed that
his acquittal proved his innocence and charged those who had subsequently raised the issue with challenging the American judicial
system, including its fundamental principle of requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Connally's claims were, of course, seriously confused. To find,
as the jury did, that Connally's guilt had not been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt is a far cry from finding that Connally had not
committed the acts alleged by the prosecution. But this simple
confusion between failure to prove a positive and proof of a negative unearths a wealth of epistemological issues related to the way
in which, as here, certain facts may be relevant to a wide range of
different decisions. These issues expose the way in which the standard of proof can and should vary dramatically with the context in
which the decision is made, the identity of the decisionmaker, and
the consequences of the decision. More particularly, as the proceedings leading to the confirmation of Justice Clarence Thomas
made clear, there may be many settings in which probabilities not
only less than beyond a reasonable doubt, but also well less than a
t Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment and Professorial Fellow of the Joan
Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University. This article is the written version of a talk given
at the University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium on "A Free and Responsible Press"
on October 10, 1992. As subsequent notes make clear, this article builds on work in which I
am engaged with Richard Zeckhauser on procedures and justifications for making adverse
decisions on the basis of low probabilities.
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preponderance of the evidence, are appropriately taken as sufficient to justify an adverse decision.
Once we identify the possibility that quite low probabilities of
guilt may justify adverse decisions in a host of non-criminal settings, we can look at an aspect of the relationship between the
press and the criminal justice system that is the reverse of the ordinary focus of courts and commentators. Ordinarily, the topic
"the press and the criminal justice system" connotes an exploration of the effect of the press on the criminal justice system, as
when we wonder whether American approaches to pretrial publicity excessively sacrifice a defendant's right to a fair trial in favor of
the press's or the public's interest in providing or obtaining information;1 when we inquire about the extent to which cameras in the
courtroom or publicity about the identity of jurors will impair the
very process of truth-finding;2 when courts wrestle with whether
published attacks on the judiciary or disclosure of court secrets
will excessively interfere with the administration of justice;' or
when we ask whether various aspects of court confidentiality are
essential for the effective functioning of the courts themselves.4
My inquiry here, however, is just the reverse. Rather than focusing on the effect of press coverage on the administration of
criminal justice, I am interested in the way in which the ideals,
images, and structures of the criminal justice system affect a range
of issues of social epistemology, largely mediated by the press.
Thus, I want to explore three related issues. First, what is the effect of the image of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" on the process of identifying official malfeasance? Does the image exert such
an effect that official malfeasance may be underidentified because
of the hold of a standard of proof that is singularly inappropriate
once the penalty is no longer incarceration or a criminal fine?
Second, are the problems suggested by the first inquiry exacerbated when there is in fact a criminal proceeding pending? When
that.is the case, the issues are more complex because the reasons

1

See, for example, Nebraska Press Association V Stuart, 427 US 539 (1976); Murphy v

Florida, 421 US 794 (1975); Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 US 333 (1966); Rideau v Louisiana,
373 US 723 (1963); Irvin v Dowd, 366 US 717 (1961); United States v Dickinson, 465 F2d
496 (5th Cir 1972).
2 See, for example, Chandler v Florida, 449 US 560 (1981); Estes v Texas, 381 US 532
(1965).
' 3 See, for example, Wood v Georgia, 370 US 375 (1962); Craig v Harney, 331 US 367
(1947); Pennekamp v Florida, 328 US 331 (1946); Bridges v California, 314 US 252 (1941).
' See, for example, Butterworth v Smith, 494 US 624 (1990); Landmark Communications, Inc. v Virginia, 435 US 829 (1978).
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for giving an actual defendant the benefit of a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard conflict with the reasons for publicly evaluating
that evidence against the person by a far lower standard. When,
for example, a member of Congress who has been indicted is running for re-election while his indictment is pending, there are good
reasons for reinforcing the view that he should not be criminally
convicted unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and
equally good reasons for reinforcing the view that voters should try
to determine the likelihood of his guilt by applying a far lower
standard. Given that the rational voter should probably do exactly
what the conscientious juror may not do-take the fact of indictment as moderately strong evidence of guilt-the dilemma facing
those who would report on these events is apparent.
Finally, in light of the above, how should the conscientious reporter think about the task of reporting given the kinds of questions raised within the criminal justice system? The evidence obtained by an investigative reporter must also be evaluated, and we
can therefore ask what standard of proof should be employed by
the reporter in making the decision that there "really" is a story
worth writing and what standard should be employed by the editor
in deciding whether to publish that story. This article is an attempt to look at one corner of the essentially empirical issue about
the extent to which law serves a legitimation function, helping
both to create and to reinforce public values because of its own
residuum of legitimacy. Under one account, legal values and ideals
pervade our society and strongly influence the creation and reinforcement of values outside of what is technically the legal system.5
But under another account, the phenomenon of legitimation is less
pervasive than it appears, and the perpetuation of the claim of legitimation is largely an act of self-glorification on the part of lawyers or legal academics seeking to claim more importance for their
enterprise than the evidence warrants.' Perhaps there is no better
case study for the phenomenon of legitimation than the effect of
the criminal process, and perhaps there is no more important link
5See, for example, Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan L Rev 57
(1984). See also Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 Harv L Rev 1497 (1983); Vilhelm Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised: My
Views on Law (Almqvist & Wiksell Foerlag AB, 1956); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in
a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J Pub L 279
(1957).
6 A variant on this is the major theme of Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can
Courts Bring About Social Change? (University of Chicago Press, 1991). See also Alan
Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis L Rev 379.
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in the hypothesized causal chain than the press. Thus, my concern
with how the criminal justice system affects the press and consequently public thinking, is the focus of this article.
I
A.
I want to start by setting out the empirical hypothesis that
drives this essay: The overwhelming majority of Americans believe
that the standard of "innocent until proven guilty" incorporates
something approximating the standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," and believe as well that this standard applies to a
range of settings and accusations of wrongful conduct far wider
than the actual criminal judicial process. This belief has encumbered many potentially adverse decisions with a burden of proof
higher than might otherwise have been selected, and higher than
might in fact be desirable.
As with any empirical hypothesis, this one could turn out to
be false, and thus it might be useful to explore the ways in which it
could be false. First, it could be false because people in general
could turn out to have no general views on the subject at all. If so,
the hypothesis that Americans believe such-and-such about the
burden of proof would be false in the same way that the hypothesis
that Americans support the Rule in Shelley's Case is false. If most
people have no views about the subject at all, then a hypothesis
that they have certain views is necessarily false. So it is quite possible that the burden of proof is simply not a part of the typical
non-lawyer's conceptual toolbox, and that whatever the typical
non-lawyer thinks about accusations of wrongdoing is not significantly influenced by the concept of burden of proof at all.
Second, even if many people do have views about burden of
proof, it is possible that they do not have the views I attribute to
them. Most plausibly, it is possible that most people have a more
subtle appreciation of the difference between the presumption of
innocence and an elevated burden of proof than I suppose. Given
that the very idea of a presumption of innocence is agnostic about
the degree of proof necessary to overcome the presumption, it is
possible that people do believe in the presumption of innocence
but understand that this entails no set of beliefs about the burden
of proof.
Finally, the general understanding of the applicability of particular burdens of proof may be every bit as finely tuned as it
ought to be. Thus it is possible that most Americans in fact do
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understand why John Connally was either confused or dishonest,
and understand as well the special reasons for, and therefore the
limited scope of, the extraordinarily high burden of proof employed in the criminal justice system.
Without suggesting that my belief in the truth of the hypothesis is any reason for accepting it, let me assume nevertheless that
the hypothesis is true. Thus, I assume that the public widely believes in the appropriateness of employing a highly elevated burden of proof with respect to accusations of wrongdoing even
outside the criminal justice system, especially when the wrongdoing charged is also conduct that would violate the criminal law.
Consequently, I believe that when people are charged with pilfering or sexual harassment in the employment setting, plagiarism in
an academic environment, cheating in tournament bridge, or placing bets as professional athletes, for example, most people initially
conceive of the processes used to determine the truth of the
charges and the processes of the formal criminal justice system as
very similar to one another.
Even if the hypothesis is true, however, it does not provide the
source of those widespread views. Therefore, I must here add an
additional hypothesis, not essential to everything discussed here
but germane to my belief that these issues have a special relationship to thinking about the role of the press in American society.
Although the fact that appellate decisions are rarely discussed in
the press makes the task of those who would claim a general effect
on public opinion for those decisions both intricate and formidable, the broad outlines of criminal trials are far more widely reported. Thus, part of my hypothesis is that the images and ideas
conveyed by the American press, and the images and ideas conveyed by mass market entertainment (the "Perry Mason" phenomenon), have played a significant role in entrenching the idea that
the criminal justice system, with its characteristic structures, procedures, and concepts, is the appropriate model to consider in any
setting in which contested questions of factual truth and falsity
must precede the taking of adverse action. Again, of course, this
may be false. Perhaps the effect of legal ideas on public opinion is
less than the conceit of lawyers and law professors supposes and
the effect of legal ideas is assimilated with less slippage in understanding than I suppose. Perhaps even if legal ideas in general
have some effect, still that effect is much less with respect to issues
of procedure than with issues of substance.
Although concededly my hypothesis may be false, there is certainly ample anecdotal evidence to suggest its plausibility. Not
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only does the general use of "presumed innocent" rhetoric appear
to incorporate a rather stringent burden of proof, but it is also the
case that John Connally is hardly the only public figure to have
had some success in arguing that a criminal acquittal has, or ought
to have, a more pervasive preclusive effect than a full understanding of the purposes and scope of the reasonable doubt standard
would seem to justify. When the issue is the permissibility of allowing William Kennedy Smith to practice medicine, Mike Tyson
to box, Pete Rose to be elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame, or
Nick Mavroules or Alcee Hastings to represent the citizens of Massachusetts or Florida in Congress, 7 we repeatedly encounter the belief that charges of serious wrongdoing, potentially leading to serious adverse consequences for the person charged, should, even
outside the criminal justice system, be evaluated only according to
a presumption of innocence and a heightened burden of proof
roughly replicating that employed by the criminal law.'
B.
But is such an approach justified? Is it appropriate for the
burden of proof to turn on the nature of the charge rather than on
the setting in which the truth of the charge is determined? Consider first the standard Blackstonian explanation of the foundations of the reasonable doubt standard: "It is better that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer." 9
Blackstone based his analysis on the notion that a wrongful
deprivation of liberty is more serious than a wrongful non-imprisonment of one who is guilty. 10 Under such a comparative-error
analysis, however, it is hardly clear that the same ratio is applicable when the stakes are different. Indeed, the preponderance-ofthe-evidence standard in civil proceedings can be said to flow from
the fact that, in theory, a wrongful deprivation of an award to a
deserving plaintiff is thought just as unfortunate as a wrongful
award in favor of an undeserving plaintiff against an "innocent"
See Part II below at 95-97.
On the public-focused aspects of the criminal process, with particular attention to
issues of burden of proof, see Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial
Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv L Rev 1357 (1985).
' William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 358 (Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott & Co., 1861).
" For application of this principle to more contemporary problems, see, generally, John
Kaplan, Decision Theory and the FactfindingProcess, 20 Stan L Rev 1065 (1968); Laurence
Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 Va L
Rev 371 (1970).
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defendant." Thus the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
presupposes that in civil proceedings the ratio that Blackstone
12
thought was ten-to-one is much more like one-to-one.
But what if we are outside the court system entirely? The
Blackstonian maxim seems premised on a retributive model of the
goals of the criminal justice system, pursuant to which the harms
of non-conviction are not the harms of under-deterrence, nor the
harms flowing from allowing someone who might commit further
crimes to go free. Rather, the harms of non-conviction are the
more amorphous harms flowing from the non-punishment of a
wrongful act. Moreover, Blackstone was weighing these amorphous
harms against the penalties imposed by a system in which most
penalties were, to put it mildly, quite serious. As a result, Blackstone was striking a balance between the harms of wrongfully executing, or imprisoning in a dungeon for decades, someone who had
committed no crime, on the one hand, against failing to exact retribution from someone who had in fact acted wrongfully. When so
characterized, Blackstone's ratio hardly seems surprising.' s
But suppose the harm of non-punishment is not merely nonretribution, but the harm that comes from not removing a criminal
from a position in which he can harm others. When, for example,
we are thinking about charges of sexual harassment against a college professor or a supervisor of numerous employees, about
charges of child molestation against a teacher, or about charges of
unfair dealing against a merchant, we begin to think differently
about the consequences of mistaken inaction. Now the harms of
wrongful "acquittal" seem much greater, for now we must consider
not only the undifferentiated social harm of non-retribution, but
also the more concrete harms that might be done by one who
should be sanctioned but is not.
" See Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Judicial Proof, 13 Cardozo L Rev 373, 383 n 33
(1991); James Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponderanceof the Evidence Standard in
Civil Litigation, 18 Tulsa L J 79, 107-08 (1982).
" The "clear-and-convincing-evidence" standard, applicable to proceedings such as the
determination of actual malice in defamation cases, proof of scienter in fraud cases, and the
civil commitment of the mentally ill, plainly strikes a middle ground. See Dacey v Connecticut Bar Association, 170 Conn 520, 537, 368 A2d 125, 134 (1976) (defamation case); Paul A.
LeBel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation: An Accommodation of the Competing Interests
Within the Current ConstitutionalFramework, 66 Neb L Rev 249, 259-60 (1987).
"3 Indeed, for some, the ratio was much higher. See, for example, Thomas Starkie, 1 A
PracticalTreatise on the Law of Evidence 506 (Nicklin & Johnson, 4th Am ed 1832) (99 to
1); John Fortescue, Commendation of the Laws of England 45 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.,
Francis Grigor trans 1917) (20 to 1).

90

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1993:

Not only is the "harm of inaction" side of the equation often
different when we move outside of the criminal justice system, but
so too is the punishment side. I do not want to assume at the outset that every criminal sentence is necessarily more disastrous to
its subject than the consequences of any decision outside the criminal justice system. For many people, public humiliation and fall
from grace, for example, are catastrophic, and I would guess that
many public officials or figures who have been publicly and irredeemably disgraced would gladly exchange that disgrace, even
taken alone, for a comparatively short period of imprisonment for
something less professionally stigmatizing, such as price-fixing or
negligent vehicular homicide. Nevertheless, the negative consequences of adverse decisions today are often less than Blackstone
assumed they would be in the case of criminal convictions. For example, although expelling a student for plagiarism may be importantly analogous to giving him a criminal sentence, precisely because the student would face consequences in his subsequent
academic and professional career, giving a student a failing grade
in a course for plagiarism may not provide as close an analogy to a
criminal sentence.
The negative consequences of an adverse decision vary with
the degree of stigma attached to its grounds, the degree of publicity (and consequent spillover sanctions), and the actual difference
between what was had and what was taken away, including the
extent to which some sense of "entitlement" had attached. In what
follows, I elaborate on each in turn.
As to stigma, the degree of harm of an adverse decision often
turns on the extent to which the basis for the decision is itself stigmatizing. There is a difference between being denied a faculty position because one's scholarship is pedestrian and being denied
that same position because one's scholarship is plagiarized. 1 Similarly, dismissing an employee for pilfering is worse than dismissing
that employee because of a general reduction in workforce, and few
would deny that for the Senate to have rejected Justice Thomas
because of their belief that Professor Hill's charges were true
would have been worse for Justice Thomas than it was for Judge
Bork to be rejected because of the majority of the Senate's belief
that he had the wrong constitutional theory.
Recognizing these carryover effects of some adverse decisions
suggests that the harm of a decision is not purely a function of its
Cognoscenti of appointments politics, however, will recognize the possibility that a
plagiarizer may redeem himself, but that the judgment of being pedestrian is permanent.
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grounds, but also of the degree of publicity it generated. If the
main harm of being dismissed for pilfering is the foreclosed future
opportunities, then presumably that harm decreases dramatically
when the basis for the decision is not disclosed, as is often the case.
Indeed, the frequency with which employees agree to "go quietly"
in exchange for a favorable recommendation or a clean record amply evidences the way in which the degree of publicity is a major
factor in the perceived severity of an adverse decision based on
stigmatizing reasons.
Finally, much of public life appears to replicate (although here
I make no claims about causation) existing due process doctrine in
treating the loss of that which one already has as different from
and worse than denial of that same position or privilege at the outset.15 Stigma aside, firing seems worse than failing to hire, even
assuming equivalent alternatives (as when a person fired can still
go back to her original position). Similarly, impeachment seems
worse than not being appointed. This may be due in part to the
entrenchment of a status quo bias in much of ordinary thought, 16
and in part to what flows from making life plans, including the
foreclosing of alternatives, based on what we think of as having, in
some soft way, "vested."
I could say much more about all of these factors, as well as
many others, but that is not my goal here." Rather, I sketch these
possibilities merely to reinforce the notion that it is quite possible
that in many settings the Blackstonian maxim might be exactly
reversed, especially with respect to adverse decisions that are nonpublic, non-stigmatizing, relate to denials rather than dismissals,
or occur in settings in which a mistaken failure to make a justified
adverse decision might be of great public importance. If so, then
just as the Blackstonian maxim leads one to the conclude that it
would be correct to acquit when there is a slight but still-extant
possibility of innocence, it would also be equally correct, when the
stakes of error are reversed, to proceed with an adverse decision
when there is a slight but still-extant possibility of guilt.

" See, for example, Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 264-65 (1970); United States ex rel
Knauff v Shaugnessy, 338 US 537, 544-46 (1950); Perkins v Lukens Steel Co., 310 US 113,
125 (1940). This distinction itself is based on a number of difficult "baseline" issues undergirding the act/omission or action/inaction distinctions. See generally David A. Strauss, Due
Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 S Ct Rev 53.
16 See William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty 7 (1988).
" This is my (shared) goal elsewhere. See Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser,
On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions (unpublished manuscript).
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There is a great deal more that could be said here by way of
embellishment. For example, it might be useful to explore the related issue of the circumstances under which it would be appropriate in public debate and press practices to aggregate multiple lowprobability conclusions, an aggregation that would generally be impermissible in the criminal process but seems epistemologically
and probabilistically justifiable in numerous non-criminal settings.1 8 But I will leave those issues for now because my primary
concern is to think about the effect of the primary conclusion-that probabilities of "guilt" of far less than 50 percent are
sufficient to justify adverse decisions in a host of non-criminal settings, such as on public debate, especially when concerning the
qualifications and performance of public figures.
C.
It is a commonplace belief among those likely to be reading
this essay that the defamation rules emanating out of New York
Times Co. v Sullivan 9 were designed to reduce the amount of
press self-censorship in reporting on the performance and qualifications of public officials, and then, after Curtis Publishing Co. v
Butts,20 of public figures as well. Although in theory New York
Times and the doctrinal apparatus it has spawned extends to a
wide range of commentaries about public officials' performance
and qualifications, 1 in practice, its greatest effect has been with
respect to specific charges of specific acts of malfeasance.
Under one view, the New York Times rules are consistent with
my epistemological speculations here. By skewing the burden of
proof so heavily in favor of the press, the actual malice rule may
actually 2 encourage the publication of charges whose likelihood of
truth is far less than whatever level of likelihood coincides with the
reasonable doubt standard.2" In this sense, the actual malice rule
allows whatever punitive action public disclosure would produce
18See id.
1- 376 US 254 (1964).
20 388 US 130 (1967) (decided with Associated Press v Walker).
21 Recall the "election," almost twenty years ago, by congressional staffers of then-Senator Scott of Virginia as the "dumbest man in the Senate." Although not germane to any
aspect of this article, the fact that Senator Scott called a press conference for the purpose of
denying the charge cannot be allowed to be forgotten with the passage of time.
2 See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unravelling the
"ChillingEffect," 58 BU L Rev 685 (1978).
11 On "whatever level of likelihood," see Frederick Mosteller and Cleo Youtz, Quantifying ProbabilisticExpressions, 5 Statistical Science 2 (1990).
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with respect to press allegations of malfeasance that are probably
true, but not necessarily true beyond a reasonable doubt.
In another respect, however, the New York Times rules and
their particular linguistic formulation produce an anomaly, perhaps as a consequence of the non-probabilistic epistemology that
seems to undergird the Court's opinions. As formulated, the actual
malice rule2 4 punishes those who publish charges they do not believe to be true, but immunizes those who publish charges they believe to be true even if the charges turn out to be false,2 5 and. even
immunizes those who publish charges they (subjectively) believe to
be true even if a reasonable person upon reasonable investigation
would (objectively) not believe those charges to be true. As added
by St. Amant v Thompson,2 6 the "reckless disregard" component
of the actual malice standard withdraws New York Times immunity for reasons of reckless disregard only from those who had
some actual suspicion that the charges might be false.2 7
The St. Amant gloss highlights the overall problem. What if
someone, whether reporter, editorial writer, or private citizen, is
considering making or repeating a charge she believes true to a
probability of 40 percent? Since one generally must believe a proposition to be more likely true than false in order to say that one
believes it," a application of the actual malice standard would caution would-be publishers of charges of wrongdoing against publishing if they believed it 40 percent likely that a charge was true, and
60 percent likely that a charge was false. And if, upon receipt of
information suggesting possible falsehood, a reporter investigated
further and then reached the 40 percent/60 percent point, the combined weight of New York Times and St. Amant would militate in
favor of non-publication, despite the fact that it might be in the
public interest to exclude from some public positions or opportuni1' As

the Court described it, actual malice is publishing a statement "with knowledge

that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times,
376 US at 280.
" See, for example, Ocala Star-Banner Co. v Damron, 401 US 295 (1971).
'6 390 US 727 (1968).
'7 "There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication" for there to be a permissible finding of recklessness. Id at 731. For a general description and critique of the "reckless
disregard" standard, see Jerome S. Kalur, Exploration of the "Outer Limits": The Misdi-

rected Evolution of Reckless Disregard,61 Denver L J 43 (1983).
"' See Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge 5-15 (Prentice Hall, 2d ed 1977) (discussing "terms of epistemic appraisal"). On the difference between belief simpliciter and
what we have reason to believe in light of what is at stake, see Brian Carr, Knowledge and
Its Risks, 82 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soc 115, 122-23 (1982).
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ties people for whom there is a 40 percent (or much less)
probability that they have committed certain misdeeds from some
29
public positions or opportunities.
To say this is not to deny the importance of stifling those who
fabricate stories for political or financial advantage. At least for
now, however, it appears that the formulation of the actual malice
rule, just as it is in some sense extraordinarily protective (at least
when measured against the rest of the world), may be at the same
time intriguingly underprotective.3 0 Questions about the technical
meaning of the actual malice rule may be pointless because, at
least as to public officials and public figures, there is little room
between the actual malice rule and a "no liability" rule. If the goal
is to create an environment in which low-probability charges
against public officials"' may be published, the existing doctrinal
terrain may adequately serve this purpose. On the other hand, if it
turns out that the existing doctrine encourages less publication of
low-probability charges than a full understanding of an expected
value account of such charges would justify, then it is possible that
some doctrinal adjustment may be warranted.

" See, generally, Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 Vand L Rev 247 (1985).
As Dean Stone's commentary and ensuing discussion at the Symposium highlighted,
there is a difference between the probability that a given piece of evidence is true and the
probability that a proposition is true. As a result, it is possible that a decision to publish will
be based on, for example, a 60 percent likelihood that the charges published are true, but
that the 60 percent is the result of cumulating numerous items of evidence none of which,
taken alone, has a probability of truth anywhere near 50 percent. The extent to which this is
true reinforces rather than undercuts the point I make in the text, as a newspaper reader
may also cumulate evidence in like fashion and may consequently have a rational interest in
learning about items of evidence, even though their individual probabilities of truth are less
than the probabilities necessary for that reader to generate an adverse decision based on the
totality of the evidence.
SOFor reasons I explore in Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 Colum L
Rev 1321 (1992), a relaxed rule of journalist behavior need not necessarily mean less ability
to recover on the part of the victim, as under rarely discussed alternatives the costs of a
relaxed liability rule might be paid by publishers, newspaper readers, advertisers, or the
public, rather than being borne exclusively by the victim.
" In light of my particular concern here, there may be an important distinction between the public official and the typical public figure, and there may as a result be reasons
for taking adverse actions against public officials on low probabilities that do not apply to
all public figures. As I think that, in general, there are grounds for drawing more of a public
official/public figure distinction than the existing doctrine permits, my views here may be
considered suspect. See Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 905
(1984). Nevertheless, there may be something special about the idea of the "public trust"
that justifies a larger range of adverse decisions against public officials based on low
probabilities that does not obtain for public figures.
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II
Because the issues are genuinely interesting, genuinely important, and attach to this particular panel at this Symposium, I now
want to re-connect this discussion with some issues relating particularly to press coverage of the criminal justice system. The typical
discussion of press coverage of the criminal justice system, including issues relating to televised trials, disclosure of the participants'
identities, pretrial publicity, mid-trial publicity and so on, focuses
on two competing interests: public interest (or so claims the press)
in knowing how the criminal justice system operates and the defendant's interest in a fair trial, unskewed by factors such as witness intimidation and juror knowledge of inadmissible evidence.
I have nothing to contribute to this debate. This issue, which
has dominated the literature for decades, 2 remains difficult, and
there is little reason to think that anything I could contribute here
would do anything to advance the debate. I do believe, however,
that perhaps I can contribute by looking at the issue from the perspective of a different range of interests, specifically the interests
in punishing (or at least identifying), outside of the criminal justice
system, those who, according to the analysis above, ought to be
removed from their official positions, where the word "ought" incorporates the "lowered" standard of proof I have previously
described.
Once we look at the free press/fair trial controversy from this
perspective, things get a bit trickier, for now we are considering
situations in which an individual is simultaneously the target of a
criminal prosecution and, almost necessarily, of charges germane to
considering whether she should retain the position she now holds
(or be selected for a position she does not now hold).
Consider the case of Nick Mavroules, former member of the
House of Representatives from the Sixth Congressional District of
Massachusetts. Mavroules, having narrowly won the Democratic

2 For early sustained treatments of the issue, see Free Press and Fair Trial, Hearings
on S 290 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong, 1st Sess
1 (1965); Howard Felsher and Michael Rosen, The Press in the Jury Box (Macmillan Pub-

lishing Co., 1966); Paul C. Reardon, The Fair Trial-FreePress Standards, 54 ABA J 343
(1968). For further discussions and citations, see Marc A. Franklin, Cases and Materials on
Mass Media Law 241-88 (Foundation Press, 1977); Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech and Law in
a Free Society 100-27 (University of Chicago Press, 1981); Donald E. Lively, Modern Communications Law (Praeger Publishers, 1991); Aviam Soifer, Freedom of the Press in the
United States, in Pnina Lahav, ed, Press Law in Modern Democracies 79, 110-14 (Longman
Publishing Group, 1985).
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Primary, ran in 1992 for re-election to Congress in the general election. At the time of the election, however, he was also the defendant in a multi-count federal indictment alleging that Mavroules
had engaged in numerous varieties of "influence peddling.""
Assume I had been a voter in Mavroules's district. As a voter,
I might have decided that I did not want to be represented by
someone who sold his office for private gain.14 If so, then I might
have concluded that, even had I otherwise been inclined to vote for
Mavroules, I would not do so if I believed to a 40 percent
probability or higher that Mavroules committed the disqualifying
act that was alleged.
But if I had this 40 percent probability threshold, and if I additionally understood that my initial assessment of Mavroules's
guilt would be raised by items of evidence themselves indicating
guilt only to a very slight degree, then a host of new items would
become relevant to my decision. I might, for example, reasonably
have believed that the fact of his indictment was strong (or at least
some) evidence of the truth of its underlying facts, that the noncross-examined and hearsay statements I read in the newspaper
about Mavroules had some bearing on the truth of the allegations,
and that Mavroules's failure to publicly explain his actions was
quite persuasive evidence of his guilt. In other words, my own epistemic processes would reasonably have led me to take account of
a large number of factors that, had I been a juror in a trial, would
not only legally but constitutionally have been totally
impermissible.
Although it is possible that some of what I say is relevant to
the establishment of "guidelines" for press coverage of criminal
proceedings when some other status of the defendant is also at issue, I want to suppose now that I am talking to the press itself.
This Symposium, after all, is focused in part on the idea of a "responsible" press, one meaning of which is what the press ought to
35
do even in the absence of legal restrictions.
Suppose I am a reporter deciding whether to publish statistically relevant information likely to be excluded from evidence at

31 Mavroules lost in the general election and subsequently entered a guilty plea to some
but not all of the pending charges.
11 As Mavroules's primary victory probably indicates, this is not the only way to think
about the issue, and this is not the only plausible view.
31 Another meaning relates to what form of press responsibility ought to be enforced by
law, but here the notion of responsibility marks the outer limits of press freedom, for legally
imposed responsibility and freedom as to the same conduct is an impossibility. See Frederick Schauer, Can Rights Be Abused?, 31 Phil Q 225, 229 (1981).

SLIGHTLY GUILTY
trial, largely for constitutional reasons. In the conventional free
press/fair trial calculation, the decision about whether to disclose
these factors, and the decision about how they should be disclosed,
would be based on a calculation of the public interest largely directed to the trial process itself. But if, as I am suggesting, there is
a simultaneous public interest in finding out information about
Mavroules that would help the rational voter to make up her mind
under the standard of proof appropriate for the voting decision,
then the calculation begins to look different.
This is not to suggest that the calculation is easy. Consider
the
effect on Mavroules's ability to get a fair trial if all of the information relevant to the voting decision is widely available to the public, including: the percentage of indictments that lead to convictions; the evidence presented to the grand jury, even if hearsay; the
reasons (or speculations about them) why Mavroules did not offer
plain and fact-specific denials; the plea bargain, if any, offered by
the United States Attorney, and the reasons, if applicable, why
Mavroules did not accept; and so on. Therefore, the goal of providing full voter information is even more at war with the goal of a
fair trial than when the public interest is only in finding out about
the workings of the criminal process. This is not to say who should
win that war or on what terms it should be settled. It is to say,
however, that it may be mistaken to think of pending criminal proceedings as preemptive in the sense that they provide the umbrella
under which all fact-finding about the events charged should take
place. If there is a public interest in having information available
that would facilitate, when necessary, findings of low-probability
"guilt" when such findings were relevant to non-criminal decisions,
then there is no reason to suppose that interest lessens upon indictment or trial. If so, then it may turn out that many of the goals
and processes of a criminal trial, or even a civil trial, are directly at
odds with the decisionmaking procedures that rational decisionmakers employ outside of the adjudicatory process.
This suggests that in many cases the existence of pending legal
proceedings ought to be thought of more as a distraction than as
the focus of news coverage. In some cases, of course, there may not
be very much trial-independent interest in the underlying facts. In
other cases, however, the public interest can be imagined without
reference to a pending criminal trial, such as when making voting
decisions. When that is so, it may be a mistake not only to think
that reporting on events and charges that would be inadmissible at
trial is "irresponsible," but also to suppose that those who report
about the trial process should be the ones reporting about the un-
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derlying events. For example, when X is on trial for bribery and
also the Chairman of the Zoning Board, there is no reason that the
nature of reporting about whether X should remain as Chairman
should look very much like the nature of reporting about X's trial.
This is not to deny that reporting largely unconcerned about a
pending trial, but still regarding the relevant events, will not have
an effect on the trial itself. Yet it seems troubling that people who
commit crimes should be less vulnerable to prosecution (or more
likely to win dismissals) because they have had the good fortune of
having an independent public interest in their misdeeds. It is still
more troubling to think that people whose misdeeds would otherwise be legitimate news should be sheltered 6 because their misdeeds have been so great as to generate an indictment. On the
other hand, it is of course also troubling to think that one's right to
a fair trial decreases upon election or appointment to public office.
Assuming that juror sequestration or voir dire examination are insufficient to remove the taint of public examination of the underlying evidence prior to a criminal trial, perhaps the solution lies in
greater public awareness of the differences between a criminal trial
and other fora for the determination of guilt. More likely, however,
there is no solution, although both society and its reporters may be
better able to accommodate fundamentally conflicting interests if
they have a full appreciation of the complexity of those interests.

36

By "sheltered" I mean two things. First, there is the possibility that otherwise news-

worthy information will remain unpublished for fear of interfering with the defendant's
right to a fair trial. Lest this seem to incorporate too rosy a picture of the nature of journal-

istic behavior, consider that I am writing here "for" or "to" the ideal journalist in much the
same way that typical normative legal scholar writes for or to the ideal judge. Second, there

is the possibility that what is published will be qualified by disclaimers uniquely appropriate to the criminal process, and that one would not normally find in other settings, such as a
warning that charges are not the same as proof.

In this connection, consider the widely used term "alleged." Given the actual malice
standard of New York Times Co. v Sullivan, there seems to be little need for the use of that
qualifier when the activities of a public official or a public figure are at issue, and when the
writer believes the charges to be true. And indeed the word rarely appears when the writer
believes the charges to be true, even if on the basis of information obtained from others,
unless the charges are also the subject of a criminal (or sometimes civil) proceeding. When
that is the case, however, "alleged" rears its head, distancing the journalist from the substance of the charges. That distance is appropriate if there is no information other than that
obtained from the trial proceedings themselves. However, when there appears to be independent corroboration, the word "alleged" is almost invariably used so long as there are
proceedings pending. One possibility is that this is merely a holdover from pre-New York

Times days, but I think it equally possible that there lurks a view that once proceedings are
instituted, an otherwise-inapplicable caution is justified.

SLIGHTLY GUILTY
III
In focusing on the decisionmaking processes of the journalist, I
am trying to think about this issue in a context different from the,
normal "what doctrines would I adopt were I a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States" perspective that characterizes
most legal scholarship. I do this partly because in many respects
the journalist is like a criminal court, for when it comes to allegations of official misconduct the publication of the story and perhaps the manner of publication can have adverse consequences
quite severe for the individual involved. The journalist who publishes a story about official misconduct is in one sense passing sentence, and should ideally be doing so in light of the burden of
proof that confronts the courts.
In light of this, it may seem plausible for the journalist, especially the investigative journalist, to think of herself as being the
equivalent of a criminal court in terms of procedures and in terms
of the burden of proof. A journalist might think she should not go
forward unless there is something approaching proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or at the very least, clear and convincing evidence.
And indeed there is certainly a great deal in contemporary press
behavior that would suggest that even if members of the press do
not have that view, they should. If we are thinking of issues of
press responsibility through the lens of the procedures and standards of the criminal justice system, it seems likely that most people would think not that the burden of proof necessary to publish
is now too high, but instead that it is not high enough.
But it may be important to distinguish a failure of effort from
a failure of proof. It is one thing to say that the press ought to get
more information, and do more work, before publishing. It is another to inquire about what burden of proof, after all the work has
been done, should be employed in the decision to publish. And it is
at that point that I am suggesting that the analysis I offered earlier, considering the calculus of error in light of goals often quite
different from those employed in the criminal justice system,
might be applicable to journalist behavior as well.
In some sense the phrase "responsible press" is unfortunate,
because too much modern rhetoric about "rights and responsibilities" suggests that there is some logical or necessary connection
between them when in fact there is nothing strange about granting
or protecting rights without enforcing commensurate responsibilities. Indeed, I have little doubt that "rights and responsibilities" is
in general a code phrase used by people who think that the rights
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in some area quite simply go too far. Still, the phrase has its use
because it does suggest that rights and responsibilities are different, and that one could at one time talk about legal rights, and at
another about (non-legally enforceable) responsibilities, in the
sense of "responsible behavior."
In light of this, I want to suggest that each journalist necessarily has already incorporated some burden of proof into her professional behavior. Each journalist has some notion of when to go forward and when to stop, of when to publish and when to wait. And
each editor has some notion of what degree of epistemic confidence
is necessary to avoid "killing" a story. When these issues arise in
the context of coverage of some event relevant to the criminal justice system, it is tempting to think that the responsible journalist
will focus primarily on the needs of the criminal justice system itself, however much it is likely that the journalist's perception of
those needs will be dramatically different from the perceptions of
other participants in the system. But it may be that the responsible journalist will think of her responsibilities differently, and focus instead on the information that a decisionmaker outside of the
criminal justice system would need in order to make the decision
that decisionmaker confronts. At times, when there is no external
decision (as there is not in many criminal trials that are covered
because of the interest in the trial itself) the responsibilities of the
journalist will be defined by the needs of the criminal justice system and the needs of the public in finding out about that system
and its processes. At other times, however, there will be just such
an external system, and in those cases it may not be that reporters
should pay more attention to the needs of the criminal justice system, but rather that they should pay less.

